Cos dla pana z autentycznej strony Berenbaumow. Tym razem ksiazkowa
recenzja. Otoz wszystko mialo sie dokladnie odwrotnie w stusunku do
tego, co pan sugeruje. Adenauerowi bardzo zalezalo na szybkim i
zdecydowanym osadzeniu Eichmanna.
"The Israeli establishment - Establishment with a capital letter is
the way that Yablonska writes the term - was ill prepared for the
trial. They were pressured by a German informant to capture
Eichmann,..."
To uwalnialo od odpowiedzialnosci setki jego urzednikow, a zwlaszcza
Gloebke'go, cytuje:
"Politicians interfered with the trial again and again. Ben Gurion was
insistent that German Chancellor Konrad Adenhauer be protected, that
his right-hand man, a former high ranking Nazi official, Hans Gloebke,
be kept out of the trial and that Hausner speak of Nazi Germany and not
Germany.
Byl to zatem proces najzupelniej polityczny:
"Golda Meir, then Foreign Minister, wanted the Mufti of Jerusalem
front and center even if he was peripheral to the guilt or innocence of
Eichmann. She wanted Nazi racist ideology included for it might impress
African states, then a major interest of Israeli Foreign Policy."
ktorego bardzo sie obawiano:
"The government feared that the Eichmann trial could also be
manipulated into a trial of the victims and not their perpetrator, of
Zionist leadership and not the German on trial."
....i dlatego zamierzano maksymalnie obciazyc Eichmanna. Tak wiec
niewiele brakowalo, aby prokurator w gorliwosci swojej uznal Eichmanna
za wiekszego zbrodniarza od Hitlera:
"Hausner (attorney general) communicated directly with the Prime
Minister and the Justice Minister. Ben Gurion saw an advance copy of
Hausner famous opening speech and wisely suggested that Adolf Hitler
name be spoken before Adolf Eichmann."
..co sie i Berenbaumowi w EB a za nim naszemu panu Jurkowi zdazylo
:-))))).
Zrodlo ponizej:
The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichman
The Trial and Our Understanding of the Shoah
Hanna Yablonka, The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann, translated from
the Hebrew by Ora Cummings with David Herman (New York: Schocken Books,
2004) pp. 336, $26.00.
The decade of the sixties is now the subject of history. In Israel, the
two most important events of the sixties have now been subjected to
serious historical study. The translation of Hana Yablonka's book now
makes the study of the Eichmann trial available to English readers much
as Michael Oren's did with his history of the Six Day War.
Any treatment of Jewish understanding of the Holocaust in the sixties
begins with the Eichmann trial, which was a turning point in our
knowledge of the Holocaust, both in Israel and in the United States and
the culmination of a brief but intense period that had brought the
Holocaust - or some semblance of it - to the cinema with the Diary
of Anne Frank and Judgment at Nuremberg and then to television with
nightly broadcasts of the reports from Jerusalem. It was brought forth
the Shoah to the world not as a sub-chapter of World War II, but as a
historical event in which the fate of the Jews loomed central.
How the thousands of journalists who have the trial would have envied
the sources now available to a Ben Gurion University historian Hanna
Yablonka who has written a concise, comprehensive, fascinating and
masterful history.
Yablonka examined David Ben Gurion's diaries, the notes of Attorney
General Gideon Hausner and his correspondence with the government and
their responses to him. She interviewed Ben Gurion's inner circle and
the policemen who interrogated Eichmann - though it was a "historic
trial" no historians interviewed Eichmann. Yablonka met with
witnesses who gave testimony and the historians who prepared evidence
for the trials. She has access to their contemporaneous notes and to
their reflections decades later. When the principles were not available
for time had taken its toll, she interviewed wives and children,
examined correspondence and files, getting as close as she can to the
trial. Her use of source material is balanced, her understanding deft
and her perspective global.
She interviewed the surviving Judges Moshe Landau and Benjamin Halevi
and is unstinting in her praise of their work, which prevented the
trial from descending into a show trial, maintained the dignity of the
Court and the integrity of the judicial process. She is less charitable
to others.
Some of her revelations would have been shattering four decades ago.
They would have resulted in front page headlines, perhaps even street
demonstrations and United Nations' Security Council meetings. Yablonka
confirms the worse suspicions of some of Israel's critics that indeed
there was no separation between the executive and the judiciary.
Hausner communicated directly with the Prime Minister and the Justice
Minister. Ben Gurion saw an advance copy of Hausner famous opening
speech and wisely suggested that Adolf Hitler name be spoken before
Adolf Eichmann.
The Judiciary and the Executive were deeply suspicious of Judge
Benjamin Halevi because of his involvement with the infamous Kastner
case where he judged the Zionist leader of Hungary of getting into bed
with the devil [specifically with Eichmann]. His decision was reversed
on appeal; so too, his language. Halevi resisted pressure to step aside
so special legislation was passed to see that he not be the presiding
Judge. The government feared that the Eichmann trial could also be
manipulated into a trial of the victims and not their perpetrator, of
Zionist leadership and not the German on trial.
Unlike the Nuremberg trial, which insisted on a trial by documents, the
Eichmann trial was based on witnesses. Yet, those who met with Eichmann
early in his career in Vienna were too favorable. His behavior was then
correct. No so, those who met with him in 1944 in Budapest. Yablonka
evaluates the major witnesses both for the effectiveness and the nature
of their testimony, and indeed her report on the dissent regarding the
testimony of famed Columbia University Jewish Historian Salo Baron
comports with my own recollections of his performance at the trial and
my own experience with the great master at the end of his distinguished
career. It reminds the reader that there is a vast difference between
intellectual demeanor and courtroom effectiveness. It was a lesson that
Raul Hilberg was to learn at the Ernst Zundel trial on Holocaust denial
in Toronto in the mid-Eightes.
It is remarkable how small a role Hannah Arendt's work Eichmann in
Jerusalem plays in Yablonka's work. Arendt's concept of the banality of
evil is flawed, fundamentally flawed. While the evildoer may be banal
- ordinary and routine - and far from the superhuman embodiment of
evil that Israel prosecutors portrayed Eichmann to be, the evil that he
and his Nazi colleagues perpetrated was anything but banal as the
testimony of survivors made that vivid throughout the trial.
Several of her many insights are worthy of special note:
The Israeli establishment - Establishment with a capital letter is
the way that Yablonska writes the term - was ill prepared for the
trial. They were pressured by a German informant to capture Eichmann,
they let a local blind man do the initial investigation in Argentine
before they assigned an Israeli police official. The legal system was
ill equipped to handle the trial. Laws had to be passed. Little work
was done in the Educational Ministry in preparation. In 1961 Israel
lacked the intellectual infrastructure of Holocaust historians capable
on making an impression on the world or the political leadership had
little faith in their own historians. Yad Vashem was helpful only in
minor ways and the much smaller museum at Lochamei Haghettot played a
much more significant role. Attorney General Gideon Hausner was trying
his first criminal case yet the never harbored a moments doubt that a
historian could ascertain regarding his readiness for the task. His
predecessor Haim Cohen, a far more distinguished jurist, a far more
nimble mind, had chosen a Supreme Court appointment over the
opportunity to try the Eichmann case. Ben Gurion expressed anxiety
about the appointment, but politics being what they were; there was
little that he could do about it. Michael Oren demonstrated the same
ill-preparedness regarding the Six Day War.
Politicians interfered with the trial again and again. Ben Gurion was
insistent that German Chancellor Konrad Adenhauer be protected, that
his right-hand man, a former high ranking Nazi official, Hans Gloebke,
be kept out of the trial and that Hausner speak of Nazi Germany and not
Germany. Golda Meir, then Foreign Minister, wanted the Mufti of
Jerusalem front and center even if he was peripheral to the guilt or
innocence of Eichmann. She wanted Nazi racist ideology included for it
might impress African states, then a major interest of Israeli Foreign
Policy.
Nevertheless, Israel muddled through and the trial worked to portray
the Holocaust to a new generation, to integrate Sepharadim into the
primordial 20th century Ashkenazic Jewry and above all to establish a
unique status for survivors within Israeli society.
The trial, Yablonka concludes, was essential to the creation of
Holocaust consciousness in Israel and to the dynamic integration of
Holocaust survivors into Israel, where the national catastrophe of the
Shoah had overwhelmed the individual experience of its survivors. It
marked Israel's coming of age in its Bar Mitzvah year of independence
and only an Israel that had come of age could embrace the atrocity that
befell the Jewish people in exile that were at the root of its being.
The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann is an important book about a
formative event at the core of Israel's national existence. It is so
well written that it is a quick and not ponderous read. Only afterwards
is the reader fully impressed with how significant the topic and how
diligent the researcher and how skilled the writer and translators.
The Judiciary and the Executive were deeply suspicious of Judge
Benjamin Halevi because of his involvement with the infamous Kastner
case where he judged the Zionist leader of Hungary of getting into bed
with the devil [specifically with Eichmann]. His decision was reversed
on appeal; so too, his language. Halevi resisted pressure to step aside
so special legislation was passed to see that he not be the presiding
Judge. The government feared that the Eichmann trial could also be
manipulated into a trial of the victims and not their perpetrator, of
Zionist leadership and not the German on trial.
Unlike the Nuremberg trial, which insisted on a trial by documents, the
Eichmann trial was based on witnesses. Yet, those who met with Eichmann
early in his career in Vienna were too favorable. His behavior was then
correct. No so, those who met with him in 1944 in Budapest. Yablonka
evaluates the major witnesses both for the effectiveness and the nature
of their testimony, and indeed her report on the dissent regarding the
testimony of famed Columbia University Jewish Historian Salo Baron
comports with my own recollections of his performance at the trial and
my own experience with the great master at the end of his distinguished
career. It reminds the reader that there is a vast difference between
intellectual demeanor and courtroom effectiveness. It was a lesson that
Raul Hilberg was to learn at the Ernst Zundel trial on Holocaust denial
in Toronto in the mid-Eightes.
It is remarkable how small a role Hannah Arendt's work Eichmann in
Jerusalem plays in Yablonka's work. Arendt's concept of the banality of
evil is flawed, fundamentally flawed. While the evildoer may be banal
- ordinary and routine - and far from the superhuman embodiment of
evil that Israel prosecutors portrayed Eichmann to be, the evil that he
and his Nazi colleagues perpetrated was anything but banal as the
testimony of survivors made that vivid throughout the trial.
Several of her many insights are worthy of special note:
The Israeli establishment - Establishment with a capital letter is
the way that Yablonska writes the term - was ill prepared for the
trial. They were pressured by a German informant to capture Eichmann,
they let a local blind man do the initial investigation in Argentine
before they assigned an Israeli police official. The legal system was
ill equipped to handle the trial. Laws had to be passed. Little work
was done in the Educational Ministry in preparation. In 1961 Israel
lacked the intellectual infrastructure of Holocaust historians capable
on making an impression on the world or the political leadership had
little faith in their own historians. Yad Vashem was helpful only in
minor ways and the much smaller museum at Lochamei Haghettot played a
much more significant role. Attorney General Gideon Hausner was trying
his first criminal case yet the never harbored a moments doubt that a
historian could ascertain regarding his readiness for the task. His
predecessor Haim Cohen, a far more distinguished jurist, a far more
nimble mind, had chosen a Supreme Court appointment over the
opportunity to try the Eichmann case. Ben Gurion expressed anxiety
about the appointment, but politics being what they were; there was
little that he could do about it. Michael Oren demonstrated the same
ill-preparedness regarding the Six Day War.
Politicians interfered with the trial again and again. Ben Gurion was
insistent that German Chancellor Konrad Adenhauer be protected, that
his right-hand man, a former high ranking Nazi official, Hans Gloebke,
be kept out of the trial and that Hausner speak of Nazi Germany and not
Germany. Golda Meir, then Foreign Minister, wanted the Mufti of
Jerusalem front and center even if he was peripheral to the guilt or
innocence of Eichmann. She wanted Nazi racist ideology included for it
might impress African states, then a major interest of Israeli Foreign
Policy.
Nevertheless, Israel muddled through and the trial worked to portray
the Holocaust to a new generation, to integrate Sepharadim into the
primordial 20th century Ashkenazic Jewry and above all to establish a
unique status for survivors within Israeli society.
The trial, Yablonka concludes, was essential to the creation of
Holocaust consciousness in Israel and to the dynamic integration of
Holocaust survivors into Israel, where the national catastrophe of the
Shoah had overwhelmed the individual experience of its survivors. It
marked Israel's coming of age in its Bar Mitzvah year of independence
and only an Israel that had come of age could embrace the atrocity that
befell the Jewish people in exile that were at the root of its being.
The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann is an important book about a
formative event at the core of Israel's national existence. It is so
well written that it is a quick and not ponderous read. Only afterwards
is the reader fully impressed with how significant the topic and how
diligent the researcher and how skilled the writer and translators.
Post by l***@gazeta.plPost by Andrew KartsNigdzie nie ma mowy o powierzeniu Eichmannowi zadan 'czolowego kata'.
Wypada, ze Encyklopedia albo jest niekompetentna w tej sprawie, albo
nieco koloryzuje, a za nia pan Jurek.
Ksywiszon "Andrew Karts" wie oczywiscie lepiej, niz "Encyclopedia
Britannica". Co tam encyklopedia, co oni tam moga wiedziec. Taki
ksywoszon "Karts" - to jest autorytet!
Warto przypomniec, ze nie tylko EB tkwi w bledach. Tak samo niezluszne
i krzywdzace Zacnego Eichmanna osady ferowano podczas procesu
Eichmanna. W bledach trwal taki na przyklad Adenauer, ktory swojego
rodaka Eichmanna okreslil mianem "najwiekszego mordercy". Cytuje za
____________________
"Friday, Apr. 21, 1961
LEGAL DOUBTS & PRACTICAL FEARS
THE issues raised by the trial of Adolf Eichmann reverberated. Granted
that Eichmann was guilty ("the biggest of the murderers," West
Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer called him last week), was his
propaganda show trial a good thing?
Some laymen wondered about the rights and wrongs of trying a man
kidnaped from a foreign land, trying him for crimes committed in still
another land, crimes that took place even before Israel was a state.
Curiously, a number of lawyers outside Israel are less disturbed by
these questions-at least on legal grounds. No court, they say, need
be concerned with how a defendant is brought before it but only with
giving the accused a fair trial. In 1883, a U.S. citizen named Ker was
traced to Peru, where he had fled to escape being tried for
embezzlement. A U.S. agent kidnaped Ker at gunpoint, brought him back
to the U.S., where he was tried and convicted. Peru might conceivably
have a grievance against the U.S.. ruled the U.S. Supreme Court, but
the defendant had none. To those who question Israel's basic right to
try Eichmann at all, Israelis say that the U.S. Supreme Court, among
others, has ruled that war criminals, like pirates, may be punished by
any sovereign state no matter where or when the crimes had been
committed.
Accomplices & Guilt. Legality was only part of the worrying. West
Germany displays visible distress at the prospect of another raking up
of Nazi atrocities. Sighed Konrad Adenauer: "There's nothing to do but
wait and see-and try to live through it." West Berlin's Evangelical
Bishop Otto Dibelius, who has himself been accused of anti-Semitism
during the Hitler era-declared in a radio address: "The whole world
will say, 'That is the way Germans are.' We will not be able to answer,
It was only a handful of Germans who in their insanity forgot all the
commandments of God.' The German people cannot exonerate themselves
from the guilt of the mass murderer and his accomplices."
The West German TV network last week carried a 65-minute Eichmann
documentary that pulled no punches, showing everything from naked men
and women being pushed into a gas chamber to a sequence of hundreds of
victims literally running into a long trench and then being shot dead
by SS men. Cried a 24-year-old German girl: "What are we supposed to
say? Must we proclaim forever that we are guilty? What more is there to
say of such horror?"
__________________________
Jak wynika z powyzszego - nie bylo Szkopom na reke wywlekanie na
swiatlo dzienne calego ogromu niemieckich zbrodni. Nie bylo im na reke
ukawnianie bezmiaru zbrodni, ktorym kierowal i zarzadzal Eichmann. To
byly zbrodnie tak odrazajace, ze nawet niemiecki kanclerz nie probowal
niczego w bawelne owijac i powiedzial wprost: "Najwiekszy morderca".
Wszyscy najwyrazniej sie mylili, z samymi Niemcami wlacznie. "Andrew
Karts" wie lepiej: Eichmann byl cacy, tylko zli Zydzi zepsuli mu
opinie. A to byl taki zacnosci czlowie, przeciez "nikogo osobiscie nie
zabil"...
No nic, ide wywietrzyc, bo od ksywiszonow folksdojczerskich okrutnie
smrodem krematoryjnym zajezdza. Jak wywietrze, to do tematu powroce.
J.M.